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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15744

-vsRONALD JOHN MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ronald John Martinez, was charged
with the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute for value in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)

(1953).

DISPOSITION IN THE LONER COURT
The appellant was tried by a jury before the
Honorable Dean E. Conder, in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The appellant

was found guilty, and appeals that conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the result
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was initially stopped by Deputy
George and Deputy Anderson while in his car at about
3900 South and 900 West in Salt Lake City (T.13), on
July 18, 1977, at about 7:30 p.m.

(T.50).

The appellant

was advised that the officers had a warrant to search
his person and his residence, and was informed of his
Miranda rights (T. 51).

At that time the appellant was

searched (T. 51), and was advised that the officers were
going to search his residence, and that the
could accompany them to the residence.

appella~

The appellant

was also informed that force would be used to gain
entrance to the residence if necessary (T.51).
The appellant testified that he was arrested
at the time his car was stopped by the officers (T.159).
The appellant accompanied the officers to his
residence at 1158 Warbler (T.13).

At that point,

Deputies Anderson and George, the appellant and his
wife (T.13,14), Detectives Duncan and Alexander,
Special Deputy Akins, and Sergeant Patience were present
in the home (T.12).

The officers began a systematic

search of the house (T.14), and located a blender, a
suspected container of heroin, a cutting edge, a quarter

-2-by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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teaspoon measure (T.14,15), an aluminum funnel (T.21),
a package of toy balloons (T.24), a strainer {T.25),
and two packages of lactose (T.27).

After the suspected

heroin was discovered at about 7:50 p.m., the. appellant
was placed under arrest (T.29).

At this time, Deputy

George asked the appellant if he understood his Miranda
rights as they had been read to him at the time he was
stopped in his car (T.31).

The appellant replied

affirmatively, and agreed to answer some questions {T.31).
After the appellant had answered several questions
(T.34,35), Deputy George testified that on his own the
appellant blurted out, "yes, I deal dope, but I sold
my last bag last night.

If you find any dope here,

you planted it." (T.35).
The Chief Toxicologist for Salt Lake City,
Donald Gunderson, testified that the substance found
in the appellant's home was 6.4 grams (T.96) of 4.3 percent
heroin (T.101).

Deputy George testified that in Salt

Lake City, heroin sold on the street ranged from one to
two percent, with most of it being one percent {T.60,61).
George testified that a balloon of heroin would contain
approximately one quarter gram of substance {T.76), and
that the amount of heroin found in the house would be

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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enough for 104 doses of street quality heroin (T.77).
Deputy George testified further that all of the
paraphernalia found,

including the balloons, was

located together in the kithcen cupboard directly
opposite the cupboard in which the heroin was found
(T.78).

The appellant testified that at the time
of his arrest both he and his wife were using heroin
(T .152, 154), and that their combined usage ranged from
ten to eighteen bags per day (T.155).
Deputy George testified that of the several
hundred addicts he knew that it was uncommon for them
to have a supply of heroin on hand (T. 42), and that in
Salt Lake City it was corrunon for the purchaser to be
forced to use the heroin at the time of purchase (T.43).
Jack Burdette, a defense witness, testified that the
most heroin he had ever been able to purchase at one
time was two spoons, or the equivalent of eight balloons
(T.132).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT IvAS ADEQUATELY ADVISED
OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS.

The testimony at trial incl.i.cates that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-4-by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellant was initially stopped by the authorities in
an automobile stop at about 7:30 p.m. on July 18, 1977
(T.50).

At that time the appellant was advised by

Deputy George that he had the right to remain silent,
that anything he said could and would be used against
him in a court of law, that he had the right to an
attorney during questioning, and that if he was unable
to afford an attorney one would be appointed by the court
without cost (T.30).

At that time the appellant indicated

that he understood his rights (T.30).
At trial, there was some question as to whether
the appellant was free to go after the authorities searched
him at his car (T.52); however, he was advised that they
would search his residence whether he was there or not
(T.52).

The appellant testified that he was placed under

arrest at the time the car was stopped (T.159).
The appellant in fact accompanied the officers
to his home (T.52), and Deputy George testified that he
was placed under arrest at about 7:50 p.m. on the 18th
of July, about 20 minutes after he was initially stopped
(T.31).

At this time, Deputy George again asked the

appellant if he understood his rights (T.31).

The

appellant said that he did, and answered several questions.

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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The argument raised by the appellant is that
the Miranda warning was not given subsequent to

the time

the appellant was placed under arrest by Deputy George

(Appellant's Brief, p. 3-9), and that the statement, "yes,,
I deal dope," allegedly made by the appellant was admittec
into evidence in violation of his Miranda rights.

A.
THE APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE
CONTINUUING CUSTODY OF THE
AUTHORITIES FROM THE TIME HE
WAS STOPPED IN HIS CAR UNTIL
THE TIME THE INCRIMINATING
STATEMENT WAS MADE.
The trial court ruled that the appellant wu
sufficiently "restrict (ed) of his freedom to render hfo
in custody" at the time he was stopped in his car.

In

effect, the court distinguished the case at hand from
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492

(1977), in which the

United States Supreme Court noted that "Miranda warnings
are required only where there has been such a restriction
on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody',"

rn ,

U.S. at 4 9 5, and held that interviews conducted in police '
stations are not inherently coercive.
The question of how much restriction is require:
to create an "in custody" situation has been addressedon'
on numerous occasions by the courts.

-6-

In State v. Paz,
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31 Or.App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977), the court noted:
"A difficulty arises as to whether
this restraint should be measured in an
objective or subjective manner. The
objective manner would look to how the
various circumstances surrounding an
interrogation might affect a reasonable
person, while the subjective manner would
look to whether a particular interrogated
defendant believed himself to be in
custody • • • The majority of the courts
have chosen the objective test." 572
P.2d at 1040.
The Oregon court relied on an earlier decision, State v.
Evans, 241 Or. 567, 407 P.2d 621 (1965), to set forth the
following criteria to determine whether a person is "in
custody":
" • • • a person is in custody if
there is • • • some element of police
control and consequent inhibition on
freedom of movement, some circumstance,
or some word or action on the part of the
police that can be reasonably construed as
physical or psychological restraint • • • • "
(EI'lphasis original.)
572 P.2d 1041.
In State v. Kennedy, 116 Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d
5~8

(1977), the court stated:
"Custody is an objective condition.
The subjective intent of the interrogator
to arrest the suspect is not, in itself,
a sufficient basis upon which to conclude
that custody exists.
[Citation omitted.]
When an arrest has not yet taken place,
the factors to be considered in deciding
whether the custody has attached are many.
Among the most important are (1) the site
of the interrogation; (2) whether the
investigation has focused on the suspect;
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I

(3) whether the objective indicia of
arrest are present; and (4) the length
and form of the interrogation." 540 p 2d
at 511.
•
Although Paz and Kennedy are factually unrelated

I,

to the case at hand, they nevertheless set forth valM
criteria with which to determine the "in custody" iss'Je,
The testimony in the case at hand indicates that
the appellant was stopped by the authorities while drivin,
his car (T.13), that he was searched (T.51,52),

advised

why he was stopped (T.13), and told that the officffs
possessed a search warrant for his residence (T.13).
He was also advised of his Miranda rights.

Although he

was asked if he wanted to accompany the officers back
to his residence (T.13), he was advised that force wooN
be used to gain entrance if necessary (T.52).

Under the

objective test, it makes no difference whether the officers \
considered the appellant to be "in custody" at this time,
since the determination hinges on whether a reasonable man
would consider himself in custody.

Under the ~ test,

i t is clear that there was some "consequent inhibition of
control" and some action that could "reasonably be
construed as physical or psychological restraint."
though the appe 11 an t was Stopped

l.

n hi' s car, which is

not customarily a coercive environment, the manner in which\

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
-8- errors.

he was stopped, and the threat of resort to violent
entry to his home was adequate to lead appellant to
conclude that he was "in custody."
In United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211
(10th Cir. 1978), the Tenth Circuit determined that
when a defendant had been (1) separated from a companion
in his car,
officers,

(2) simultaneously confronted by four

(3) told he was suspected of passing counter-

feit money,

(4) told to surrender counterfeit money in

his possession, and (5) given the choice between inunediate
arrest and "voluntary" appearance the next day, the action
of the officers was "functionally equivalent to an arrest,"
579 F.2d at 1214, and that a Miranda warning was necessary.
The DiGiacomo criteria closely parallel the circumstances
surrounding the automobile stop in the instant case.
If the subjective approach is used to determine
whether or not the appellant was "in custody," the
appellant's own testimony at trial that he was placed
under arrest at the time he was stopped (T.159), is
dispositive of the issue.

Indeed, the appellant's

testimony may indicate that he was actually placed under
arrest at the time he was stopped.

-9-
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B

THE CLOSE PROXIMITY BETWEEN
THE TIME THE APPELLANT WAS
STOPPED AND THE TIME THE
STATEMENT WAS MADE OBVIATED
THE NEED FOR A SECOND MIRANDA
WARNING.
The appellant was stopped in his car at about
7: 30 p.m.

(T. 50), and less than one half hour later

he made the allegedly inadmissible statement.

Immediately

prior to the time he made the statement, Deputy George
asked him if he understood his rights (T.31).

This served

to remind appellant that the rights were available to him
and that the officers were cognizant of those rights.
In State v. Lenon, 570 P.2d 901 (Mont. 1977),
the defendant was arrested for possession of dangerous
drugs and taken to jail.
rights at about 3:00 a.m.

He was advised of his ~
At 9: 00 a.m. the same morning,

without a subsequent warning having been given, the
defendant executed a statement in response to police
questions.

The Court stated:
"Such a brief time lapse between
the verbal warning and the- confession
did not by itself, under the facts of
this case, create a duty to verbally
repeat those warnings • • • Rather,
defendant gave every indication that
he understood his rights when he told
Officer Hossack on the morning of the
confession that he did not want to call

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a lawyer. Under the 'totality of the
circumstances,' the defendant understood
his rights, confessed voluntarily, and
there was no need to repeat the Miranda
warning." 570 P.2d at 907.
In State v. Pyle, 216 Kan. 423, 532 P.2d
1309 (1975), the defendant was charged with murder
of his grandmother.

On one occasion prior to his

arrest, the defendant, subsequent to being advised
of his rights, was interviewed by two state agents.
During the course of the interview, the defendant attempted
suicide by taking an overdose of drugs.

After being taken

to the hospital he confessed to the crime.

On appeal, the

defendant contended that the confession was involuntary
because i t was not immediately preceded by a warning as to
his rights.

The Kansas Court rejected the argument:

"There is no merit to this contention.
Just three hours earlier he had been given
a concededly complete warning in his
attorney's office • • • Once a suspect is
fully advised of his rights and understands
them, it is not necessary to give repeated
Miranda warnings each time he is interviewed."
532 P.2d at 1321.
The State submits that the appellant was in
custody from the time he was stopped in his car, and
that he was advised timely of his Miranda rights.

In

addition, the close proximity in time between the initial
warning and the subsequent statement eliminated the need
for a second warning.
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POINT II
ASSUMI~JG, ARGUENDO, THAT THE
MIRANDA WARNING HAS NOT GIVEN 1
TIMELY, Tl'E STATEMENT COMPLAINED
OF IS ADMISSIBLE AS A SPONTA'.JEOUS
DECLARATION.

Deputy George testified that subsequent t o p 1acing
the appellant under arrest at his home and asking him if he
•1nderstood his Miranda rights, he asked the appellant a
few questions

(T. 31).

"Then without any question asked
by anyone, the Deputies or any Provocation on 0ur part, the suspect just
blurted out to us he said, yes--he
said yeah, I deal dope, but I sold
my last bag last night.
If you find
any dope here, you planted it."
(T.

35)

..

The Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(19 6 6) , promulgated sever al important

guidelines for the protection of the rights of a suspect and
yet left unchanged an area that is relevant to the instant
case.
"In dealing with statements obtained
through interrogation, we do not purport
to find all confessions inadmissible.
Confessions remain a proper element in
law enforcement.
Any-statement given
freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences is, of course,
admlssible in evidence."
384 U.S. at 478.
The conduct of the officers in the instant case
.
preserved an atmosphere free f_rom coercion.

The circumstances

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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surrounding the event point to a spontaneous, voluntary
statement:

petitioner was not placed in an interviewing room

or any confining area; no appreciable amount of time passed
between his apprehension and the statement; no deception or
trickery was used; in sum, all elements of the so-called
"third degree" were missing.
In State v. Easthope, 29 Utah 2d 400, 510 P.2d 933
(1973), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"It was he who initiated the further
conversation.
. . . He voluntarily
made the response of which he now
complains. The orivilege against
self-incrimination does not protect
an accused against statements he
voluntarily makes after he has been
informed of his rights." 29 Utah 2d at 404.
In Easthope, supra, the defendant agreed to participate in
a lineup.

Prior to the lineup, he was advised of his

Miranda rights.

The defendant

was identified as the assailant

and placed under arrest, and was reminded of his rights.
He then asked the basis for his arrest, and was advised that
he had been identified in the lineup.

The defendant then

remarked that he did not see how he could be identified
with a silk stocking over his face.

It was this statement

he sought to suppress.
The facts in Easthope parallel those in the instant
case, and the standard of voluntariness

shoula be applied

in the instant case.
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POINT III
THE FAILURE OF THE OFFICER TO
ADVISE APPELLANT OF HIS RH~HT
TO STOP QUESTIONING \'IAS NOT A
VIOLATION OF HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT
OR MIRANDA RIGHTS.
In Miranda v. Arizona, supr.a, the court held that:
. . . an individual held for
interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to
consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate
today. As with the warnings of the
right to remain silent and that
anything stated can be used in evidence
against him, this warning is an absolute
prerequisite to interrog?tion. No
amount of circumstantial evidence that
the person may have been aware of this
right will suffice to stand in its
stead."
86 S.Ct. at 1626.
The court continued:
"Once warnings have been given, the
subsequent J)rocedure is clear.
If
the individual indicates in any manner,
at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease."
It is clear from Miranda itself that the need to
advise the party of his right to cease answering questions is
not mandatory.

384 U.S. 473-474.

In United States v. DiGiacomo, supra, the
government argued that Miranda imnosed no obligation

to
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excressly advise suspects they can terminate questioning
at any time.

The court replied:

"Although there may be no excress
requirement to warn suspects of the
right to terminate questioning, the
government's failure to so warn is
certainly an important factor to be
considered in determining the
voluntariness of any statements
made."
579 F.2d at 1214.
This position is virtually identical to the one enumerated
by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosely, 423
(1975), and referred

~o

u.s.

96

by the appellant in his brief at

pages 10 and 11.
Whether appellant's right to cut off questioning
was violated hinges not on whether he was advised of the
right, but on whether his "right to cut off questioning" was
in fact "scrupulously honored."

423 U.S. 105.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that this
right was violated.

The appellant indicated his willingness

to respond to questions

(T. 31).

He was asked enly five

or six questions, and furthermore, the comment he seeks to
have suppressed was not made in response to any question,. but
was snontaneously made (T. 34,35).
Appellant's submission in his brief (page 11)
thct his right to cut off questioning is not honored unless
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he is advised of the right is entirely unsupported by case
law, and indeed rejected by Miranda itself.
1627.

86 s.ct. at

State v. Workmen, 20 Utah 2d 178, 435 P.2d 919

(1968), reversed per curiam 393 U.S. 21, is clearly
distinguishable from the instant case.
the defendant

·~as

In '"ork~,en
V'•

, •.

I

SUpra,

not advised of his right to have an attorne"
'I

appointed if he could not afford one.

This was one of the

elements which the Supreme Court stated in Miranda to be
mandatory.

86 S.Ct. at 1627.

Respondent asserts that oo

Miranda violation occurred in the instant case.
POINT IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE MIRANDA
WARUING WAS NOT TIMELY GIVEN, THE
ADMISSION OF THE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT
IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
"A verdict or finding shall not be
set aside nor shall the judgment or
decision thereon be reversed, by
reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless .
(b) the court
which passes upon the effect of the
error or errors is of the opinion
that the admitted evidence should have
been excluded on the ground stated
and probably had a substantial influence in bringing about th~
verdict or finding . • . "
This court has on numerous occasions pointed out
that "it will not reverse criminal cases for mere error or

-16-
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irregularity."
(1953).

State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 75 6

Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Ann.,

(1953) states in

part:
"If error has been committed,
it shall not be presumed to have
resulted in prejudice. The court must
be satisfied that it has that effect
before it is warranted in reversing
the judgment."
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18

(1967), considered

the problem resulting from an error at trial involving a
right protected by the federal constitution.
"We are urged by petitioners
to hold that all federal constitutional
errors, regardless of facts and
circumstances, must always be deemed
harmful.
We decline to adopt
any such rule."
386 U.S. at 21-22.
In a Tenth Circuit case, Chase v. Crisp, 523 F.2d
595 (Ca. 10 1975),

cer~.

denied, 424 U.S. 947, the court

analyzed the Chapman test of "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt," and noted that in light of Harrington v. California,
395 U.S.

250

(1969), the Supreme Court had not held that

a "departure from constitutional procedures should result in
an automatic reversal."
r

1.

523 F.2d at 598.

The Tenth Circuit

also addressed the problem of determining the effect of the
improper evidence on the jury and said:
"We must focus on its probable
impact upon the minds of 'an average
jury.'
'Our judgment must be based
upon our own reading of the record and
on what seems to us to have been the
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probable impact . . . (of the
ina~nissitle evidence} on the minds
of the average jury.
Harrington,
supra.'" 523 F.2d ."'It 5<:18.
The court also compared the weight of the properly

admitt~

evidence to that of the inadmissible evidence.
Assuming, _arguendo, that the testimony ::-eg2rding
the appellant's dee lara tion was il".lproperly admitted in this
case, there was still adequate evidence to convince the
reasonable juror of the appellant's guilt.

Apart from the

challenged testimony, the State offered evidence of the
paraphernalia found in the appellant's home (T. 14, 15, 18 ,21,
24,25,26,27,28) and of the al".lount and quality of the heroin
found

(T. 96, 101).

The State also offered evidence of

the street value of the heroin (T. 165,166), and of the
appellant's and his spouse's income (T. 164,176).
addition, the State introduced

In

testimony in regards to the

difficulty of purchasing a sizeable amount of heroin in
Salt Lake City, and the appellant's own witness testified
that the most heroin he was able to buy at the time in
question was "two spoons,"

(T. 135), a small quantity.

It is clear that an error puroorted to affect
constitutional rights does not require automatic reversal.
In addition, unless the trial court's determination of
admissibility is shown to be clearly erroneous, the Supreme
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Court should not reverse.

No such showing has been made.
CONCLUSION

Because appellant was advised timely of his
Miranda rights, the testimony of Deputy George (T. 35)
relating the appellant's statement was properly admitted at
trial.

Even if the Miranda warning was not properly given,

the statement is admissible as a voluntary, spontaneous
declaration.

If this Court finds that the statement was

improperly admitted, respondent submits that in light of
the other evidence presented at trial, admission of the
statement does not rise to the level of reversible error.
Appellant's second claim, that the Miranda warning
he received was incomplete, is uithout merit.

There is no

case law to support his contention, and he offers no evidence
to show that this right to cut off questioning was not
"scrupulously honored."
In light of the foregoing reasoning and
authority, respondent urges this Court to affirm the decision
of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys fc•r Re.spondent

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-19Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

